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IDS PRACTICE AFTER THERASENSE AND THE 
AIA: DECOUPLING THE LINK BETWEEN 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
Arpita Bhattacharyya† and Michael R. McGurk†† 
Abstract 
The duty to disclose material information to the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office under 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (Rule 56) is a 
critical requirement when prosecuting a patent application in the 
United States. The failure to disclose information can result in a later 
ruling of inequitable conduct rendering the patent unenforceable. The 
Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Therasense heightened the 
“materiality” and “intent” standards for finding inequitable conduct. 
However, there has been much uncertainty in the patent community 
regarding the future of the duty of disclosure under Rule 56. The 
majority in Therasense theorized that curing the “plague” of 
inequitable conduct would solve the over-disclosure problem faced by 
the Patent Office. Others, including the dissent in Therasense, argue 
that without the threat of inequitable conduct, patent applicants and 
practitioners will ignore their duty to disclose and the information 
gap between the Patent Office and applicants will widen; this will 
result in further impaired patent quality. The supplemental 
examination provision in the America Invents Act (AIA), a legislative 
cure for the proliferation of inequitable conduct charges, has 
heightened the concern among critics that information submission to 
 
 †  Arpita Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., is a third year law student (Class of 2013) at the 
Northeastern University School of Law. She is also a Student Associate/Patent Agent at the 
Boston, MA office of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. 
 ††  Michael R. McGurk is the Resident Managing Partner at the Boston office of 
Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP. 
Any discussions set forth in this Article are the personal views of the authors and do not 
reflect the views of Finnegan. This Article is for informational purposes only and is not intended 
to constitute legal advice. 
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the Patent Office will dwindle. 
The Therasense Court’s answer to the over-disclosure problem 
and the concerns raised by critics are premised on the notion that 
inequitable conduct and the duty of disclosure always go in tandem. 
However, inequitable conduct and the duty of disclosure are not 
inseparably tied; and, changes in the inequitable conduct landscape 
may not have a significant effect on information disclosure practice 
before the Patent Office. First, despite the tightening of the 
inequitable conduct standard, information submission to the Patent 
Office will likely not decrease from the pre-Therasense level. This is 
because there are many other incentives within the patent system for 
applicants and practitioners to continue to err on the side of over-
disclosure. Second, supplemental examination will not sound the 
death knell for the duty of disclosure. This is because patentees are 
not likely to use this provision to purge willful omissions or 
misrepresentations from the examination record. And third, over-
disclosure is likely to remain a problem for the Patent Office and 
needs to be addressed in other ways. This Article concludes with 
suggestions for the Patent Office to consider on how to rein in over-
disclosure, while encouraging applicants and practitioners to be 
forthcoming with information relevant to patent examination. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Code of Federal Regulations, at 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (also 
known as Rule 56), establishes a duty of candor and good faith in 
dealing with the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(hereinafter “Patent Office”).1 This requires patent applicants and 
practitioners to disclose to the Patent Office all information known to 
be material to patentability (popularly known as the “duty of 
disclosure”). The duty of disclosure attaches to every individual who 
is involved with the preparation, filing and/or prosecution of the 
patent application.2 
Rule 56 is intended to improve the quality of examination and 
the validity of patents,3 but its influence is not limited to patent 
applications and the examination process. Rule 56 has long guided the 
determination of the materiality prong of the inequitable conduct 
defense,4 which has had far-reaching effects in patent litigation. A 
 
 1. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012). 
 A patent by its very nature is affected with a public interest. The public 
interest is best served, and the most effective patent examination occurs when, at 
the time an application is being examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates 
the teachings of all information material to patentability. Each individual 
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent application has a duty of 
candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to 
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to 
patentability . . . . [N]o patent will be granted on an application in connection 
with which fraud on the Office was practiced or attempted or the duty of 
disclosure was violated through bad faith or intentional misconduct. 
Id. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Rene D. Tegtmeyer, The Patent and Trademark Office View of Inequitable 
Conduct or Attempted Fraud in the Patent and Trademark Office, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 88, 88 (1998). 
 The purpose of the duty of disclosure requirement, as the Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) views it, is to improve the quality of examination and 
the validity of patents by assuring that material information is called to the 
examiner’s attention and considered in the patent examining process. 
Id. Mr. Tegtmeyer is the former Assistant Commissioner of the Patent Office. See also 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 733 (2009). 
 4. See Christian E. Mammen, Controlling the “Plague”: Reforming the Doctrine of 
Inequitable Conduct, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329, 1334 (2009); Revision of the Materiality to 
Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 
43,631, 43,632 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 Historically, the Federal Circuit connected the materiality standard for 
inequitable conduct with the PTO’s materiality standard for the duty of 
disclosure. That is, the Court has invoked the materiality standard for the duty of 
disclosure to measure materiality in cases raising claims of inequitable conduct. 
In doing so, the Court has utilized both the ‘reasonable examiner’ standard set 
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finding of inequitable conduct can render an entire patent family 
unenforceable.5 Chief Judge Rader, writing for the majority in 
Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co.,6 famously called the 
doctrine of inequitable conduct the “atomic bomb” of patent law.7 
Allegations of inequitable conduct form “a dark cloud over the 
[litigated] patent’s validity.”8 It increases overall litigation costs, 
discourages settlements, portrays the patentee as a “bad actor,” and 
can destroy the reputation of patent prosecutors.9 
Due to the potential windfalls and lack of disincentives for 
alleging inequitable conduct, defendants in patent infringement suits 
routinely use this defense as a part of their litigation strategy.10 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal 
Circuit”) has long recognized this problem. Judge Nichols in 
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Dayco Corp.11 calls it an “absolute 
plague” upon the patent litigation system.12 
 
forth in the 1977 version of § 1.56(b) and current § 1.56(b) promulgated in 1992. 
See, e.g., Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Inc., 
394 F.3d 1348, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
Id. 
 5. See Bruce D. DeRenzi & Sean E. Jackson, A Procedural Remedy for the “Plague”? 
Pleading Inequitable Conduct after Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., N.Y. INTELL. PROP. 
L. ASS’N BULL., Aug.-Sept. 2010, at 9, available at 
http://www.nyipla.org/images/nyipla/Documents/Bulletin/2010/August-September2010.pdf; see 
also Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]nequitable 
conduct with respect to one or more patents in a family can infect related applications . . . .”). 
 6. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 7. Id. at 1288; see also Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 
1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 8. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1288; see also Zhe (Amy) Peng et al., A Panacea for 
Inequitable Conduct Problems or Kingsdown Version 2.0? The Therasense Decision and a Look 
into the Future of U.S. Patent Law Reform, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 373, 398 (2011). 
 9. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1288; Peng et al., supra note 8, at 398. 
 10. See Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1289 (“One study estimated that eighty percent of 
patent infringement cases included allegations of inequitable conduct. . . . Inequitable conduct 
‘has been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent 
system.’”) (citation omitted); Kevin Mack, Note, Reforming Inequitable Conduct to Improve 
Patent Quality: Cleansing Unclean Hands, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 155–56 & tbl.1(2006) 
(noting that the inequitable conduct defense is adjudicated in sixteen to thirty-five percent of all 
infringement cases that make it to trial and inferring that the percentage of cases in which 
defendants plead inequitable conduct, but do not make it to trial, is substantially higher). 
 11. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 12. Id. at 1422 (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent 
case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled to make the 
charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client’s 
interests adequately, perhaps.” (emphasis added)). 
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The proliferation of inequitable conduct charges has led patent 
applicants and practitioners to err on the side of over-disclosure in 
their Information Disclosure Statement (IDS) practices,13 which some 
argue reduces the quality of patent examination.14 The Therasense 
Court expressed concern that the specter of inequitable conduct 
allegations has caused many patent applicants and practitioners to 
overflow the Patent Office with a “deluge of prior art references, most 
of which have marginal value,” in order to avoid inequitable conduct 
allegations.15 The Court further noted that over-disclosure puts 
unnecessary strain on the Patent Office’s limited examining 
resources, increases backlog, and ultimately hurts the quality of 
patents issued by the Office.16 
The Federal Circuit recognized the problems created by the 
expansion and overuse of the inequitable conduct doctrine. It 
addressed the issue en banc in Therasense with an eye towards curing 
the “plague” of inequitable conduct.17 It is far too early to tell whether 
the standards articulated in Therasense will restrain the proliferation 
of inequitable conduct charges, and consequently reduce the incentive 
 
 13. It is widely accepted that the drastic consequences of an inequitable conduct finding 
motivates applicants and practitioners to submit any reference that has the slightest connection 
to the invention, which causes detrimental information overload and hurts patent quality. See, 
e.g., Cotropia, supra note 3, at 768 (“The most common method of overcomplying under the 
current legal regime is to submit everything of even remote relevance in one’s possession to the 
USPTO.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal 
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 315 (2001) (“Where the applicant is already well 
informed of the prior art, the specter of inequitable conduct too often causes applicants to submit 
virtually every reference of which they are aware.”). But see Dennis Crouch & Jason Rantanen, 
References Cited, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 19, 2009), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/02/references-cite.html (stating that analysis of applicant 
disclosure rates from January 1, 2009 to February 18, 2009 revealed that applicants submit over 
200 references in only 2% of cases, and 15% of patented cases include absolutely no applicant-
cited references). 
 14. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 770-72. 
 15. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1289. The court expressed concern that the pre-
Therasense inequitable conduct doctrine required patent applicants to over-disclose, resulting in 
a flood of references with questionable materiality. The court’s opinion shows that the 
relationship between inequitable conduct and over-disclosure was effectively advocated by 
amici. Id. (citing the briefs submitted by the United States and the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization). 
 16. See id. at 1290 (“While honesty at the PTO is essential, low standards for intent and 
materiality have inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, among them, increased 
adjudication cost and complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, burdened courts, strained 
PTO resources, increased PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality.”). 
 17. See id. (“This court now tightens the standards for finding both intent and materiality 
in order to redirect a doctrine that has been overused to the detriment of the public.”). 
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for patent applicants to inundate the Patent Office with marginally 
relevant information. 
There remain many detractors, including the dissent in 
Therasense, who argue that without the threat of inequitable conduct, 
patent applicants and practitioners will have no incentive to comply 
with the Rule 56 duty of disclosure.18 The AIA’s supplemental 
examination provision, also designed to reduce inequitable conduct 
charges, has heightened the concern that information submission to 
the Patent Office will decrease substantially and impair the quality of 
patents.19 
The common belief among the Therasense majority and the 
critics of inequitable conduct reform is that inequitable conduct and 
information disclosure are inseparably tied. The authors argue that 
this logic is flawed because inequitable conduct and information 
disclosure to the Patent Office do not always go in tandem. 
First, information disclosure to the Patent Office will probably 
not decrease from the pre-Therasense level. This is because there are 
many factors, aside from the fear of inequitable conduct allegation, 
that incentivize patent applicants and practitioners to bring prior art 
references to the attention of the Patent Office. For instance, such 
submissions bolster a patent against post-issuance challenges at the 
Patent Office and strengthen the presumption of validity that attaches 
to an issued patent. These factors will continue to serve as incentives 
for patent applicants and practitioners to bring material—and perhaps 
even marginally relevant information—to the attention of the Patent 
Office during prosecution. The “egregious misconduct” caveat in 
Therasense, and the uncertainty surrounding the type of affirmative 
act that is likely to rise to the level of egregious misconduct, will 
highly motivate patent applicants and practitioners to adhere to their 
 
 18. See id. at 1306 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“It is unrealistic to expect that other means 
will provide an effective deterrent to ensure that material information will not be withheld 
during patent prosecutions. The PTO advises us that the prospect of enforcing the duty of 
disclosure other than through the threat of inequitable conduct claims is not possible or 
practical.”); Peng et al., supra note 8, at 398; Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. 
Becton Dickinson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L & TECH. 226, 256 (2012). 
 19. Lisa A. Dolak, America Invents the Supplemental Examination, But Retains the Duty 
of Candor: Questions and Implications, 6 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 147, 168 (2012); Jason 
Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge & Jay P. Kesan, America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 229, 244 (2012); Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of 
Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 24 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/110/rantanenpetherbridge.
pdf. 
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pre-Therasense diligence in submitting information to the Patent 
Office. Specifically, the practice of over-disclosing is often less risky 
and more cost-effective to an applicant than determining the 
materiality of all known references. Therefore, many applicants and 
practitioners will simply continue with their pre-Therasense IDS 
practices instead of taking on the added costs and risks associated 
with subjectively evaluating the materiality of each and every known 
prior art reference. 
Second, the AIA’s supplemental examination is not likely to 
change the amount and quality of the information disclosure to the 
Patent Office. It is highly doubtful that patent applicants or 
practitioners will purposefully misrepresent or withhold relevant 
information during prosecution, then present the same information to 
the Patent Office after issuance via supplemental examination. A 
patentee will have very little to gain from such deceitful behavior, 
particularly because of the high likelihood of ex parte reexamination 
being prompted by a supplemental examination request and the risks 
associated with reexamination. The fraud provision in supplemental 
examination combined with the cost associated with this process will 
also deter abuse of the provision to cure knowing and deliberate 
omissions. 
Lastly, it seems highly unlikely that the changes in the 
inequitable conduct landscape, as a result of Therasense and the AIA, 
will stem from the overflow of information to the Patent Office. This 
is because the costs and risks associated with under-disclosure are 
very high compared to that of over-compliance with the duty of 
disclosure. Unless addressed by the Patent Office in other ways, the 
problem of over-disclosure is likely to continue unabated. This Article 
proposes some changes to the Information Disclosure Statement 
(IDS) requirements of the Patent Office to discourage over-disclosure, 
limit undue strain on the examination resources of the Patent Office, 
and improve the quality of patents. 
II. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AND THE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE: 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Part II of this Article first explores the evolution of the law of 
inequitable conduct, with a particular focus on post-Therasense 
Federal Circuit cases that help to clarify the current standards for 
materiality and intent required for finding inequitable conduct. 
Second, the amendments to Rule 56 that have been proposed by the 
Patent Office following the Therasense decision are discussed. And 
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finally, the supplemental examination provision of the AIA, which is 
likely to have a substantial impact on inequitable conduct litigation, is 
considered. 
A. The Law of Inequitable Conduct 
Inequitable conduct20 is a judicially created defense to patent 
infringement that evolved from the equitable doctrine of unclean 
hands.21 Thus, inequitable conduct requires inequity arising from a 
patentee’s actions or deliberate omissions before the Patent Office in 
the course of obtaining a patent.22 
1. Inequitable Conduct Doctrine before Therasense 
To successfully assert the defense of inequitable conduct, an 
alleged infringer must show that the patentee “(1) made an affirmative 
misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material 
information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended 
to deceive” the Patent Office during prosecution of the patent 
application.23 If the court determines that the threshold levels of both 
materiality and intent are met, then the court must balance materiality 
and intent “with a greater showing of one factor allowing a lesser 
showing of the other.”24 In other words, the court could equitably 
balance the evidence of intent and materiality to determine whether 
the patentee’s conduct was sufficiently culpable to warrant rendering 
 
 20. For scholarship on inequitable conduct, see generally Cotropia, supra note 3, at 733-
37; Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 37, 49-50 (1993); Brett Ira Johnson, The Inequitable Conduct Defense in 
Patent Litigation: Where We Are, Where We Have Been, and Where We Should Go from Here, 
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 198 (2012); John F. Lynch, An Argument 
for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 
AIPLA Q.J. 7, 8 (1988); Mack, supra note 10, at 156-61; Mammen, supra note 4, at 1332; Lee 
Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit and Inequitable Conduct: An 
Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1295-1303 (2011). 
 21. See Mammen, supra note 4, at 1333. See also Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. 
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814 (1945) (discussing that the doctrine of unclean hands 
evolved from requirements of conscience and good faith, and gives a court of equity discretion 
to close its doors to claimants who are tainted with inequitableness or bad faith). 
 22. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 733-35 (discussing the requirements of the inequitable 
conduct doctrine); 4 ROBERT A. MATTHEWS, ANNOTATED PATENT DIGEST § 27:58 (2012) 
(titled “Overview of the Requirement of Intent to Deceive”). 
 23. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 476 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). 
 24. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 236 F.3d 684, 693 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
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the entire patent unenforceable.25 Under the balancing test, courts 
assessed inequitable conduct using a “sliding scale” of intent and 
materiality.26 This established a legal notion that a reduced showing 
of intent could be offset by a strong showing of materiality, and vice 
versa. 27 The “sliding scale” doctrine blurs the fact that materiality and 
intent are separate elements; the threshold levels for both of these 
elements must be established by the party alleging inequitable 
conduct. Because it is usually difficult to find express evidence of 
intent to deceive, the lowered standard for intent made inequitable 
conduct allegations very attractive to defendants. 
With Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.,28 the 
Federal Circuit attempted to stem the growing tide of inequitable 
conduct cases. The Kingsdown Court overturned prior precedent that 
held that a showing of “gross negligence” was sufficient to meet the 
intent to deceive prong of inequitable conduct, and instead, the court 
established a “sufficient culpability” standard.29 
Nevertheless, over the last decade the proliferation of the 
inequitable conduct defense has proven difficult to control. Several 
post-Kingsdown Federal Circuit decisions gradually chipped away at 
the “sufficient culpability” standard and reduced it to a mere “should 
have known” standard,30 which is arguably a lower standard than the 
pre-Kingsdown “gross negligence” standards. For instance, in Ferring 
B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc,31 the court held that a patentee’s failure to 
 
 25. See Monsanto Co. v. Bayer BioScience N.V., 363 F.3d 1235, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 26. Peng et al., supra note 8, at 378 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson 
& Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 27. See id. (explaining that the “sliding scale” was interpreted by courts to mean that if 
the undisclosed or misrepresented information was highly material, there need not be much clear 
and convincing evidence of intent to deceive). 
 28. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 29. Id. at 876. 
We adopt the view that a finding that particular conduct amounts to ‘gross 
negligence’ does not of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the 
involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence 
indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding 
of intent to deceive. 
Id. (citing Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970)). 
 30. Mammen, supra note 4, at 1331. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1239-40 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[W]here withheld information is 
material and the patentee knew or should have know[n] of that materiality, he or she can expect 
to have great difficulty in establishing subjective good faith sufficient to overcome an inference 
of intent to mislead.” (emphasis added)). 
 31. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc, 437 F.3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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disclose his prior business relationship with declarants (who provided 
affidavits in support of patentability during prosecution) was a 
material misrepresentation to the Patent Office.32 Since the applicant 
“knew or should have known” that the undisclosed relationship was 
material, the intent-to-deceive prong was also satisfied.33 
The materiality standard for finding inequitable conduct has also 
flip-flopped considerably since Kingsdown. Even though Rule 56 had 
been modified following Kingsdown to replace the “reasonable 
examiner” standard with a more objective set of rules, the Federal 
Circuit resurrected the pre-1992 “reasonable examiner” standard in 
Digital Control.34 In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge 
Medical, Inc.,35 decided in 2007, the Federal Circuit held that the 
rejection of claims during prosecution of one patent is material to the 
prosecution of a co-pending application if “a reasonable examiner 
would substantially likely consider [such information] important in 
deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent.”36 And 
if there was any uncertainty left after Digital Control and McKesson, 
the Federal Circuit in 2008 clarified in Star Scientific that the 
“reasonable examiner” test was the controlling standard for 
materiality.37 
The vague and inconsistently defined standards for materiality 
and intent since Kingsdown, combined with the powerful remedy 
incentives, resulted in overuse of the inequitable conduct defense.38 
The expansion of the doctrine in turn fueled over-compliance with the 
duty of disclosure, resulting in detrimental information overload on 
the Patent Office.39 
 
 32. See id. at 1188, 1190-91. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(stating that the “reasonable examiner” standard should continue to exist as one of the tests for 
materiality). 
 35. McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  
 36. Id. at 913 (quoting Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 
1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 37. Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (reciting only the “reasonable examiner” standard for materiality). 
 38. See Mammen, supra note 4, at 1361 (discussing that the prevalence of the inequitable 
conduct cases has expanded as a result of the overbroad doctrine). 
 39. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 767-72 (discussing the high-cost of non-compliance 
and the low cost of compliance as causing overcompliance, which ultimately hurts patent 
quality). 
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2. Inequitable Conduct Doctrine under Therasense 
Citing the ubiquity of the inequitable conduct defense and its far-
reaching consequences on both patent prosecution and litigation, the 
Federal Circuit sitting en banc in Therasense addressed the issue of 
inequitable conduct charges that have been “overused to the detriment 
of the public.”40 
The Therasense Court raised the standard for finding inequitable 
conduct in three principal ways. Starting with the intent to deceive 
prong, the majority decided that an accused infringer must prove that 
the patentee acted with a “specific intent” to deceive the Patent 
Office.41 Under the new test, intent can be established only by clear 
and convincing evidence that (1) the applicant knew of the reference, 
(2) knew it was material, and (3) made a deliberate decision to 
withhold it.42 Gross negligence or proving that the applicant “should 
have known” that the reference was material is not sufficient to 
establish the intent prong of the inequitable conduct charge.43 
Second, the Therasense Court determined that “the materiality 
required to establish inequitable conduct is a “but-for” materiality.”44 
In other words, information undisclosed by the applicant is deemed 
material only if the Patent Office would not have allowed a claim had 
it been aware of the undisclosed information.45 In making this “but-
for” materiality determination, the Federal Circuit directed the district 
courts to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard used by 
the Patent Office, not the clear and convincing standard used by 
courts in determining patent invalidity.46 After describing the 
heightened standard for materiality, the Federal Circuit recognized an 
exception to the “but-for” standard for “cases of affirmative egregious 
conduct,” such as the submission of false affidavits, manufacturing of 
false evidence, perjury, suppression of evidence, and bribery.47 
Finally, the Federal Circuit abolished the “sliding scale” test and 
explained that materiality and intent are separate elements that cannot 
 
 40. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 41. Id. (citing Star Scientific, Inc., 537 F.3d at 1366). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. (citing Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 
(Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
 44. Id. at 1291. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. at 1291-92. 
 47. Id. at 1292-93. 
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be inferred from or weighed against each other.48 In particular, the 
Federal Circuit found that “to meet the clear and convincing evidence 
standard, the specific intent to deceive must be ‘the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’”49 That is, 
if multiple reasonable inferences may be drawn from a piece of 
evidence, intent to deceive cannot be found.50 
After the Federal Circuit’s Therasense decision, the defendants 
did not petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court. The Therasense decision is the law of the land, at least for 
now. Several post-Therasense Federal Circuit cases discussed below 
elucidate the new materiality and intent standards for finding 
inequitable conduct. 
a. Materiality Standard under Therasense 
In American Calcar, Inc. v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,51 
the Federal Circuit’s first post-Therasense case addressing the issue 
of inequitable conduct, the Court explained that to prove inequitable 
conduct the accused infringer must provide evidence that the 
applicant (1) misrepresented or omitted material information, and (2) 
did so with the specific intent-to-deceive the PTO.52 The Court further 
explained that the misrepresented or omitted information must be 
“but-for” material to the patent at issue under the Therasense 
standard.53 Applying this standard, the Federal Circuit agreed with 
defendants that the undisclosed information was “but-for” material to 
one of the asserted patents.54 This was because the district court had 
found that the asserted claims of that patent are anticipated by the 
undisclosed information.55 With regard to a second set of asserted 
patents, the Court found that although the jury rejected defendant’s 
invalidity arguments based on the undisclosed information, the 
withheld information could still have been “but-for” material if it 
would have blocked issuance of the patent claims under the Patent 
Office’s preponderance of the evidence standard, giving those claims 
 
 48. Id. at 1290. 
 49. Id. at 1290-91 (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 
1357, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 50. See id. 
 51. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 52. Id. at 1334. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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their broadest reasonable construction.56 Because the Court was not 
able to infer that finding from the district court’s opinion, it vacated 
the district court’s findings of materiality as to the second set of 
patents and remanded the issue.57 
In August Technology Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd.,58 the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Camtek’s inequitable 
conduct defense. It reasoned that an undisclosed reference was not 
“but-for” material prior art because it would not have rendered the 
claims of the asserted patent obvious in view of the other prior art 
references of record.59 Specifically, the district court had found that 
one of applicant’s devices, information about which was not disclosed 
to the Patent Office during examination, was not on sale prior to the 
critical date of the asserted patent, and therefore, the undisclosed 
information was not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).60 The district 
court dismissed as moot defendant’s inequitable conduct charge.61 On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit found that even if the undisclosed device 
was on sale and constituted prior art, it would not render the asserted 
claims obvious in view of the other cited prior art.62 On this basis, the 
Court concluded that the undisclosed information was not material 
prior art under the but-for materiality standard set forth in Therasense. 
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 
defendant’s inequitable conduct counterclaim.63 
In Powell v. Home Depot USA Inc.,64 the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s finding that a patent applicant’s failure to 
notify the Patent Office of a change in status for a Petition to Make 
Special is neither a ground for finding of inequitable conduct under 
the “but-for” material standard, nor does it constitute “affirmative 
egregious misconduct” under Therasense.65 
 
 56. Id. at 1335. 
 57. Id. 
 58. August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 59. Id. at 1290. 
 60. Id. at 1288. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 1290. 
 63. Id. (citing Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291-92 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 64. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 65. Id. at 1235. 
 Where, as here, the patent applicant fails to update the record to inform the 
PTO that the circumstances which support a Petition to Make Special no longer 
exist—that conduct does not constitute inequitable conduct. . . . . That is so 
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In light of the post-Therasense Federal Circuit cases, the “but-
for” material standard can be viewed as requiring a defendant to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more claims of the 
asserted patent would have been anticipated or rendered obvious if the 
patent examiner had been aware of the undisclosed (or 
misrepresented) information. 
b. Intent to Deceive Standard under Therasense 
In American Calcar, the Federal Circuit’s first inequitable 
conduct case after Therasense, the Court concluded that the district 
court applied an incorrect standard in determining intent to deceive 
the Patent Office by the applicant.66 The Court explained that under 
the Therasense standard, “the accused infringer must prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that the applicant knew of the reference, 
knew that it was material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold 
it.”67 The Court found that the district court had relied on the sliding 
scale standard that was rejected en banc in Therasense.68 Accordingly, 
the Court vacated the district court’s finding of intent and remanded 
the issue.69 
Similarly, in Cordis Corp. v. Boston Scientific Corp.,70 the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of lack of 
inequitable conduct, because the defendant had failed to prove 
deceptive intent by clear and convincing evidence as required under 
Therasense.71 
 
because Mr. Powell’s conduct obviously fails the but-for materiality standard and 
is not the type of unequivocal act, ‘such as the filing of an unmistakably false 
affidavit,’ that would rise to the level of ‘affirmative egregious misconduct.’ 
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1292-93). 
 66. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 651 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 67. Id. (quoting Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 71. Id. at 1361. The Federal Circuit explained in a footnote: 
 This appears to be a case where [defendant] proved the threshold level of 
intent to deceive, but that proof was rebutted by [applicant’s] good faith 
explanation. . . . [Defendant’s] argument therefore hinges, as it did below, on 
[applicant’s] credibility. . . . [I]t was the province of the district court to 
determine credibility, and ‘[t]his court gives great deference to the district court’s 
decisions regarding credibility of witnesses.’ 
Id. n.6 (last alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison 
Co., 227 F.3d 1361, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
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In Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc.,72 the Federal Circuit for 
the first time since Therasense affirmed a holding by the district court 
that rendered two of the asserted patents unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct. Materiality was not an issue on appeal, because 
the district court had invalidated the patents using the undisclosed 
references.73 Regarding the intent to deceive prong, the Federal 
Circuit upheld the district court’s rejection of the inventor’s rationale 
for withholding certain references.74 The Court explained that 
Therasense “confirmed that inequitable conduct requires clear and 
convincing evidence of a specific intent to deceive the [Patent Office] 
and that the specific intent to deceive must be the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”75 While the 
inventor testified that he withheld the references because they 
described only “failed experiments,” the Court noted the contrary 
evidence in the record and the district court’s finding that the 
inventor’s testimony lacked credibility.76 It held that the district 
court’s finding of specific intent to deceive the Patent Office was not 
clearly erroneous.77 
Based on the outcomes of the post-Therasense inequitable 
conduct cases before the Federal Circuit, it is now clear that 
determination of inequitable conduct requires distinct findings of 
intent and materiality, rather than employing the sliding scale 
approach, and that deceptive intent has to be established by clear and 
convincing evidence. Despite the more rigorous intent standard 
adopted in Therasense, at least the Aventis Pharma case demonstrates 
that the Federal Circuit is willing to affirm well-reasoned and 
unequivocal findings of intent to deceive the Patent Office. 
Time will tell how much Therasense changes the inequitable 
conduct landscape in a manner envisioned by the majority. In the 
meantime, the Patent Office has taken a position consistent with the 
Therasense majority that the change in the inequitable conduct 
standard will minimize the impulse to over-comply with the duty of 
disclosure. The Patent Office has also proposed to revise Rule 56 to 
reduce the incentive to inundate it with marginally relevant 
 
 72. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 73. Id. at 1334. 
 74. Id. at 1335-37. 
 75. Id. at 1335 (quoting Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 
1290 (Fed. Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 1335-37. 
 77. Id. 
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information. 
B. Post-Therasense Changes to Rule 56 
In 1989, a year after the Kingsdown decision that heightened the 
standard for finding inequitable conduct, the Patent Office proposed 
amendments to Rule 56 seeking to replace the “reasonable examiner” 
standard with a clearer and more objective set of rules.78 In 1992, the 
Patent Office adopted the amended version of Rule 56, which remains 
in place today.79 
Historically, the Federal Circuit has followed the Patent Office’s 
materiality standard for the duty of disclosure to measure materiality 
for inequitable conduct claims.80 In the past decade, however, the 
Federal Circuit has only loosely followed the standard for materiality 
adopted in the 1992 version of Rule 56.81 In Digital Control, the 
Federal Circuit reverted back to the “reasonable examiner” standard 
and reasoned that the 1992 version of Rule 56 was “not intended to 
replace or supplant the ‘reasonable examiner’ standard.”82 
Following Therasense, the Patent Office has once again 
proposed to revise Rule 56.83 It hopes to mend the disjunction 
between the Federal Circuit’s materiality standard for inequitable 
conduct and the Patent Office’s materiality standard for the duty of 
disclosure.84 The proposed amendment to Rule 56 would define that 
information is material to patentability under Therasense if it falls 
under the “but-for-plus” standard, i.e., (1) the Patent Office would not 
allow a claim if it were aware of the information, applying the 
preponderance of the evidence standard and giving the claim its 
broadest reasonable construction; or (2) the applicant engages in 
affirmative egregious misconduct before the Patent Office as to the 
 
 78. See Duty of Disclosure, 56 Fed. Reg. 37,321 (proposed Aug. 6, 1991) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10). 
 79. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2012); Duty of Disclosure, 57 Fed. Reg. 2021 (Jan. 17, 
1992) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 10). 
 80. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose 
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 81. Mammen, supra note 4, at 1334-35. 
 82. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Mach. Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (identifying the Patent Office’s material to patentability standard as one of the many 
standards the courts could apply). 
 83. Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. at 43,631. 
 84. Id. 
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information.85 Moreover, “neither mere nondisclosure of information 
to the Office nor failure to mention information in an affidavit, 
declaration, or other statement to the Office constitutes affirmative 
egregious misconduct.”86 
The Patent Office emphasized that its proposed changes to Rule 
56 was voluntary and not required by Therasense.87 This is because 
the Patent Office’s materiality standard and the court’s inequitable 
conduct standard are “not inseparably tied.”88 Nevertheless, the Patent 
Office noted that harmonization of the two materiality standards had 
several benefits.89 In particular, the Patent Office stated that it expects 
the “but-for-plus” standard from Therasense to “result in patent 
applicants providing the most relevant information and reduce the 
incentive for applicants to submit information disclosure statements 
containing only marginally relevant information out of an abundance 
of caution.”90 At the same time, by creating an exception to punish 
affirmative egregious acts without penalizing mere failure to disclose 
information that would not have changed the issuance decision, the 
“but-for-plus” standard “will continue to prevent applicants from 
deceiving the Office and breaching their duty of candor and good 
faith.”91 Additionally, the Patent Office stated that it believes a 
unitary materiality standard would be simpler for the patent bar to 
implement.92 
It is yet to be seen whether the proposed amendments to Rule 56 
would have any impact on IDS practices. It is unclear whether they 
would solve the over-disclosure problem as anticipated by the 
Therasense majority and the Patent Office. 
C. Supplemental Examination 
Another recent development that lies at the intersection of Rule 
56 and inequitable conduct is the AIA’s supplemental examination, 
which also was designed to reduce the rampant overuse of inequitable 
conduct charges in patent litigation. The supplemental examination 
provision of the AIA, enacted on September 16, 2011, provides a 
 
 85. Id. at 43,632. 
 86. Id. at 43,633. 
 87. Id. at 43,632. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
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patentee with an avenue to ask the Patent Office “to consider, 
reconsider, or correct information believed to be relevant to [a] 
patent”93 at any time after the issuance of that patent. This provision 
took effect on September 16, 2012; it applies to any patent issued 
before, on, or after that date.94 
Supplemental examination allows the patentee to have 
information that was not considered during the initial examination of 
the patent to be considered after the grant of the patent. Once such 
information is considered, the patent cannot be held unenforceable on 
the basis of conduct relating to such information.95 That is, the 
patentee is shielded from allegations of inequitable conduct stemming 
from the information that was presented to the Patent Office in the 
supplemental examination request. There is also a possibility that the 
patentee can get protection from sweeping discovery of information 
related to the supplemental examination. If the information submitted 
in the supplemental examination request raises a substantial new 
question of patentability, the patent shall be subjected to 
reexamination according to the current ex parte reexamination rules.96 
 
 93. 35 U.S.C. § 257(a) (2011). 
Request for supplemental examination.—A patent owner may request 
supplemental examination of a patent in the Office to consider, reconsider, or 
correct information believed to be relevant to the patent, in accordance with such 
requirements as the Director may establish. Within 3 months after the date a 
request for supplemental examination meeting the requirements of this section is 
received, the Director shall conduct the supplemental examination and shall 
conclude such examination by issuing a certificate indicating whether the 
information presented in the request raises a substantial new question of 
patentability. 
Id. 
 94. Peter G. Thurlow & Maya Elbert, Inequitable Conduct: Analysis of Post-Therasense 
Court Decisions and the Supplemental Examination Provision of the America Invents Act, 




 95. See 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1) (2011). 
In general.—A patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct 
relating to information that had not been considered, was inadequately 
considered, or was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the 
information was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental 
examination of the patent. The making of a request under subsection (a), or the 
absence thereof, shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 
282. 
Id. 
 96. Id. § 257(b). 
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To take advantage of the “shielding effect” of supplemental 
examination, the patentee must request supplemental examination 
before a patent challenger raises an allegation of inequitable conduct 
in a declaratory judgment action or an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA) notice.97 In a patent enforcement action, the 
patentee is insulated from inequitable conduct allegations only if the 
examination (including reexamination of the patent pursuant to the 
supplemental examination request) is concluded before the date on 
which the action is brought.98 
Supplemental examination can be helpful in maximizing the 
value of a patent in the following situations: (1) to address certain 
information that came to the attention of the patentee between 
allowance and issuance without having to resort to a Request for 
Continued Examination (RCE); (2) to address the concerns of 
investors and potential partners during a due diligence investigation, 
valuation, or licensing negotiations; and (3) to cure issues that may be 
raised by an adverse party challenging the enforceability of the patent. 
Supplemental examination is a powerful tool to address 
problems with issued patents. The patent community anticipates that 
as part of a pre-litigation strategy, supplemental examination will give 
patentees an opportunity to reduce or eliminate known weaknesses in 
their patents prior to initiating a patent infringement action.99 This 
will minimize the chances of the patent being held unenforceable due 
to inequitable conduct.100 Thus, supplemental examination can be said 
to be the AIA’s cure for the “plague” of inequitable conduct. 
III. THE IMPACT OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT REFORM ON 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
With Therasense, the Federal Circuit created a new, heightened 
standard for finding inequitable conduct. The new standard for 
materiality and intent under Therasense, coupled with the heightened 
standard for pleading inequitable conduct under Exergen Corp. v. 
 
 97. Id. § 257(c)(2)(A); see also Clara N. Jimenez & Rebecca M. McNeill, Using 
Supplemental Examination Effectively to Strengthen the Value of Your Patents, 82 PAT., 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 751 (Sept. 30, 2011), available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=0aa7d6b6-e467-46f6-
b9e8-3ace89e1f58e. 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(2)(B). 
 99. Jimenez & McNeill, supra note 97. 
 100. Id. 
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Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,101 is expected to make pleading and proving 
inequitable conduct much harder for defendants. 
In addition to raising the bar for finding inequitable conduct, 
Therasense is expected to provide clearer guidance to patent 
applicants and practitioners on what information must be submitted to 
the Patent Office during prosecution. According to the Therasense 
majority, the “but-for” materiality framework provides “clear 
guidance to patent practitioners and courts, while the egregious 
misconduct exception gives the test sufficient flexibility to capture 
extraordinary circumstances.”102 The Patent Office has similarly 
expressed the hope that Therasense will reduce the rampant overuse 
of inequitable conduct, consequently reducing the incentive to file 
Information Disclosure Statements (IDSs) laden with “marginally 
relevant” information.103 
Despite the confidence exuded by the Patent Office that 
applicants will continue to be forthcoming with information relevant 
to patent examination,104 many commentators have expressed concern 
that without the threat of inequitable conduct, patent applicants and 
practitioners will have no incentive to disclose relevant information to 
the Patent Office.105 The Patent Office’s lack of resources and 
expertise to monitor, adjudicate and enforce compliance with Rule 56 
adds fuel to the concern that the heightened standard for inequitable 
conduct will simply widen the information asymmetry between patent 
examiners and applicants.106 
Regardless of the diminished threat of inequitable conduct 
allegations and/or findings, there are many reasons for patent 
applicants and practitioners to not change their pre-Therasense 
prosecution practices. First, the patent system inherently has many 
 
 101. Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (adopting 
strict pleading standards for the defense of inequitable conduct, which required deceptive intent 
to be pleaded with particularity). 
 102. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 103. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose 
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 106. See Lisa Dolak, supra note 19, at 170 & n.111 (citing Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., 
Evolution and Future of New Rule 56 and the Duty of Candor: The Evolution and Issue of New 
Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 138–40 (1992)) (noting that the Patent Office had previously 
determined it was ill-equipped to investigate possible instances of fraud that came to its 
attention); Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1306 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
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incentives for patent applicants to continue submitting relevant 
information to the Patent Office, albeit with less fear of an inequitable 
conduct allegation and/or finding if an ensuing patent is litigated. 
Second, the egregious misconduct caveat in Therasense will spur 
patent applicants and practitioners to continue with any pre-
Therasense diligence in submitting information to the Patent Office. 
Third, there are many economic incentives for patent applicants and 
practitioners to continue with their pre-Therasense IDS practices. 
Additionally, supplemental examination is not likely to reduce 
information submission to the Patent Office because supplemental 
examination is not a “get out of jail free card.”107 
A. Therasense Will Not Stifle Information Flow to the Patent 
Office 
The threat of an inequitable conduct allegation is not the only 
impetus driving patent applicants and practitioners to abide by their 
duty of disclosure to the Patent Office. Although the Therasense 
decision and the supplemental examination provision are expected to 
shield many applicants and practitioners from successful inequitable 
conduct charges, there are many other reasons for them to continue 
submitting information to the Patent Office. 
1. Incentives within the Patent System to Comply with the 
Duty of Disclosure 
Patent applicants and practitioners have always had, and will 
continue to have, many good reasons, aside from the threat of 
inequitable conduct allegation, to present information to the Patent 
Office during prosecution. 
a. Bolstering against Post-Issuance Challenges at the 
Patent Office 
The AIA introduces two new inter partes mechanisms, namely, 
post-grant review and inter partes review, for levying challenges to 
the validity of a granted patent at the Patent Office. These post-grant 
proceedings are relatively inexpensive compared to litigation, and 
therefore, the Patent Office is expected to become an attractive forum 
 
 107. 157 CONG. REC. E1208 (daily ed. June 24, 2011) (statement of Rep. Henry A. 
Waxman arguing that supplemental examination is a “card” that, if played properly, will 
encourage applicants to use a variety of strategies to obtain a patent that would not have been 
available previously, and immunize such conduct before a competitor can challenge the patent). 
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for patent challengers. 
Any party, except the patent owner, may file a petition to 
institute post-grant review within nine months from grant or reissue of 
a patent as long as it is not challenging the patent’s validity in a civil 
action.108 The petitioner may request cancellation of one or more 
claims on any basis set forth in paragraphs two or three of § 282(b) 
for invalidity, including for example, novelty, obviousness, written 
description, enablement and statutory subject matter.109 The inter 
partes review provision allows additional attacks on a patent’s 
validity after the period during which post-grant review may be 
initiated or, if post-grant review is initiated, at the conclusion of the 
post-grant review.110 The basis for inter partes review is limited to 
patents or printed publications, as in the current inter partes 
reexamination process.111 While post-grant review provides a 
petitioner a forum to challenge a patent on any basis of patentability, 
inter partes review is limited to novelty and non-obviousness.112 
The AIA raises the bar of entry for initiating a post-grant review 
or inter partes review. Specifically, it mandates that the Director may 
institute an inter partes review or a post grant review proceeding only 
where a petitioner meets the threshold requirements.113 For an inter 
partes review, the petitioner must demonstrate a “reasonable 
likelihood” that he/she would prevail as to at least one of the claims 
challenged.114 For a post-grant review, the petitioner must 
demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that at least one of the 
claims challenged is unpatentable.115 
Additionally, for a post-grant review, the petitioner may show a 
novel or unsettled legal question that is important to other patents or 
 
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 321(a)-(c) (2011); Anthony C. Tridico & Erin M. Sommers, What’s Next 
for the U.S.—The Metric System?: A Quick Look at the “Imminent” Major U.S. Patent Law 
Reform, CIPA J. (June 2011), available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=df7a4aa5-9c71-4a8c-
b2b8-350c91d2bf00. 
 109. Id. 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 311 (a)-(c). 
 111. Id. § 312. 
 112. Id. § 311(b). 
 113. See generally Justin A. Hendrix & Robert F. Shaffer, Post Grant Proceedings of the 
AIA Provide New Opportunities and Require Reconsideration of Old Patent Litigation 
Strategies, MED. DEVICE (June 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.finnegan.com/resources/articles/articlesdetail.aspx?news=598696f7-7eba-4fcb-
83b8-2369caa91dd3. 
 114. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
 115. Id. § 324(a). 
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patent applications.116 The “reasonable likelihood standard allows for 
the exercise of discretion but encompasses a 50/50 chance whereas 
the ‘more likely than not’ standard requires greater than a 50% chance 
of prevailing.”117 For both post-grant and inter partes review, the 
decision of the Patent Office whether to institute a review is final and 
non-appealable.118 
The current ex parte reexamination standard requires that a 
substantial new question (SNQ) of patentability be raised; this 
requirement is met in almost 95% of the reexamination requests 
filed.119 The standards for post-grant and inter partes review are much 
higher than the standard for ex parte reexamination. In view of the 
higher bar for initiating inter partes post-issuance challenges at the 
Patent Office; petitioners will likely have to set forth “the best ground 
of unpatentability as to each challenged claim to facilitate early 
resolution of the issues.”120 
The AIA also provides that “[i]n determining whether to institute 
or order a [post-grant] proceeding . . . , the Director may take into 
account whether, and reject the petition or request because, the same 
or substantially the same prior art or arguments previously were 
presented to the Office.”121 This provision provides only a 
discretionary duty to take into account the previously considered prior 
art. Nevertheless, it is highly probable that it would factor into the 
threshold determination, because failure to exercise the discretion 
would invite harassment of patentees and misuse of Patent Office 
resources.122 Chief Judge Smith’s explanation that “[i]n instituting an 
[inter partes review] or [post-grant review], the Board may take into 
 
 116. Id. § 324(b). 
 117. Message from Chief Judge James Donald Smith, Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences: USPTO Discusses Key Aspects of New Administrative Patent Trials, USPTO.GOV, 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/smith-blog-extravaganza.jsp (last modified May 21, 
2012) [hereinafter Message from Chief Judge Smith]. 
 118. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 47 (2011) (“The threshold for initiating an inter partes 
review is elevated from ‘significant new question of patentability’—a standard that currently 
allows 95% of all requests to be granted—to a standard requiring petitioners to present 
information showing that their challenge has a reasonable likelihood of success.”). 
 120. Message from Chief Judge Smith, supra note 117; see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d), 
325(d). 
 121. 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (emphasis added). 
 122. See Scott A. McKeown, Will Post Grant Patent Proceedings Revisit Failed 
Arguments?, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2012/04/will-post-grant-patent-proceedings-
reconsider-failed-arguments. 
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account whether the same or substantially same prior art or arguments 
previously were presented to the Office,”123 further clarifies that the 
Patent Office is unlikely to institute a post-grant proceeding on the 
basis of previously-considered art. Accordingly, it is highly likely that 
a petitioner will have to set forth prior art reference(s) or other 
information that was previously not before the Patent Office to 
institute a post-grant challenge; more so if the patent examiner had 
previously applied the disclosed information for Office Action 
rejections and those rejections were successfully traversed.124 
Defending a post-issuance challenge at the Patent Office can be 
needlessly expensive and time-consuming for a patentee. It can delay 
enforcement or monetization of an issued patent. Therefore, there are 
many incentives for patent owners to shore up their patent claims 
against post-issuance validity challenges at the Patent Office by 
proactively disclosing known material information during initial 
examination, so that the same prior art is perhaps less likely to be 
used later by an adversary to levy a post-issuance challenge at the 
Patent Office. 
b. Stronger Presumption of Validity over Prior Art 
Considered by the Patent Office 
Issued patents are “presumed valid” and the burden of 
establishing invalidity rests on the party asserting such invalidity.125 
The presumption of validity can be overcome only by clear and 
convincing evidence, regardless of whether the prior art offered at 
 
 123. Message from Chief Judge Smith, supra note 117 (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(d), 
325(d)). 
 124. This appears to be in sharp contrast with the ex parte reexamination provision, which 
remains as an option after AIA for challenging the validity of a patent at the Patent Office. Ex 
parte reexamination allows the use of previously considered references (“old art”) to support a 
SNQ if shown in a “new light.” See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“The existence of a substantial new 
question of patentability is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed publication was 
previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”); see also In re Swanson, 540 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 125. See 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
In general.—A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a patent (whether in 
independent, dependent, or multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims; dependent or multiple dependent 
claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim. 
The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on 
the party asserting such invalidity. 
Id. § 282(a). 
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trial was considered by the Patent Office.126 The logic underlying the 
presumption is that the Patent Office has scrutinized the patent and 
their expert judgment is entitled to deference by the courts.127 
Although in theory the presumption of validity extends to both 
disclosed and undisclosed prior art, the presumption appears to be 
stronger when prior art was considered by the Patent Office and weak 
when it was not.128 
In the i4i case, appellant Microsoft and its amici argued that a 
preponderance standard should apply where the evidence before the 
fact finder was not before the Patent Office during the examination 
process.129 Previously, in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,130 
the Supreme Court had called into question the application of the 
presumption to prior art not considered by the Patent Office.131 
However, in i4i, the Supreme Court rejected the idea of a two-tier 
system for the presumption of validity and decided that the clear and 
convincing evidence standard remains even for prior art not 
considered by the Patent Office; but, added that when there is new 
prior art asserted by a defendant during litigation, the jury should 
ordinarily be given an instruction on that point.132 The Court 
specifically endorsed the “commonsense principle that the Federal 
 
 126. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2243 (2011) (holding that under 
35 U.S.C. § 282 the standard for patent invalidity is clear and convincing, not mere 
preponderance of the evidence). 
 127. See Christopher A. Cotropia, Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven N. Sampat, Do Applicant 
Patent Citations Matter? Implications for the Presumption of Validity 4-5 (Stanford Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 401, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1656568; Todd L. Juneau & Jill K. MacAlpine, Protecting Patents 
from the Beginning: The Importance of Information Disclosure Statements During Patent 
Prosecution, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 577, 580 (2000) (“Because a qualified 
government agency, which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have some 
expertise in interpreting references and to be familiar with the level of skill in the art, is 
presumed to have done its job properly, a very high level of deference is created.”). 
 128. See Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 6-7. 
 129. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2244. 
 130. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 131. Id. at 426 (stating that “the rationale underlying the presumption—that the PTO, in its 
expertise, has approved the claim—seems much diminished here” with regard to art not before 
the Patent Office). 
 132. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2251-52. 
When warranted, the jury may be instructed to consider that it has heard evidence 
that the PTO had no opportunity to evaluate before granting the patent. . . . [T]he 
jury may be instructed to evaluate whether the evidence before it is materially 
new, and if so, to consider that fact when determining whether an invalidity 
defense has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 2251. 
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Circuit has recognized throughout its existence—namely, that new 
evidence supporting an invalidity defense may ‘carry more weight’ in 
an infringement action than evidence previously considered by the 
PTO.”133 
In i4i, the Supreme Court ultimately gives the jury the ability to 
consider the presence of new evidence “when determining whether an 
invalidity defense has been proved by clear and convincing 
evidence.”134 Because judges and juries are not trained to understand 
the technical details of the prior art, they are generally less likely to 
second-guess the expertise of the patent examiner, and therefore, fact-
finders are far more receptive to arguments that the examiner never 
considered a particular piece of prior art.135 Consequently, fact-finders 
are more likely to invalidate a claim based on prior art not previously 
considered by the Patent Office. 
Although the presumption of validity and the clear and 
convincing evidence standard for patent invalidity extends even to 
undisclosed prior art, the strength of that presumption of validity, at 
least in the minds of the fact-finder, is largely dependent on whether 
the prior art was previously considered by the patent examiner.136 
This provides significant incentive to patent applicants and 
practitioners to bring all known material information to the attention 
of the Patent Office to gain the complete benefit of the presumption of 
validity afforded to an issued patent. 
The above-described incentives—strengthening against post-
grant challenges and perhaps strengthening the presumption of 
validity—will continue to motivate patent applicants and practitioners 
to bring material (and perhaps even marginally relevant information) 
to the attention of the Patent Office during prosecution. 
Additionally, disclosure of all known information during the 
initial examination of a patent application provides protection against 
discovery of undisclosed information during litigation as well as any 
unpleasant questioning that could follow. Even if an applicant 
 
 133. Id. (quoting Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1360 
(Fed. Cir. 1984), abrogated by Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 
(Fed. Cir. 2011)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 6-7; Juneau & MacAlpine, supra note 127, at 
580 (“Even if an infringer provides clear and convincing evidence of invalidity, there is an 
additional burden of overcoming the deference given to the PTO by the courts.”). 
 136. See Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 6-7; Juneau & MacAlpine, supra note 127, at 
580. 
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subjectively believes that certain information is not material to 
patentability, discovery of intentional non-disclosure can give rise to 
claims of inequitable conduct, thereby casting a cloud over the 
patent’s validity, threatening the practitioner’s reputation, and 
increasing the overall litigation costs. 
From a litigation perspective, it is advantageous for patent 
applicants and practitioners to disclose all known information during 
prosecution, both material and marginally relevant ones, in order to 
avoid the disruption that can follow from discovery of the same 
information during litigation. 
2. The “Egregious Misconduct” Loophole in Therasense 
The Therasense court ratcheted up the materiality standard for 
inequitable conduct, but recognized an exception to the requirement 
for materiality, determining that “[w]hen the patentee has engaged in 
affirmative acts of egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an 
unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is material.”137 The Court 
created this exception to strike a “necessary balance between 
encouraging honesty before the [Patent Office] and preventing 
unfounded accusations of inequitable conduct.”138 In both Therasense 
and Home Depot, the Federal Circuit explained that applicant’s 
misconduct must be an unequivocal act, such as the filing of a false 
affidavit, to rise to the level of “affirmative egregious misconduct.”139 
The Therasense court’s exception for egregious misconduct 
appears to be extremely narrow and apply only to deliberately 
planned and carefully executed schemes to defraud the Patent Office. 
However, the Court has left the metes and bounds of this exception 
largely vague. It is unclear whether extraordinary circumstances, such 
as complete lack of diligence in submitting relevant information to the 
Patent Office, or deliberate attempts to remain unaware of any 
potentially relevant information, would fall within the exception. 
As the contours of the egregious misconduct exception are 
worked out in the forthcoming Federal Circuit and district court case 
law, it is possible that many litigators will frame their allegations as 
affirmative acts of “egregious misconduct” to continue to get the 
 
 137. Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 138. Id. at 1293. 
 139. Powell v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 663 F.3d 1221, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing 
Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290, 1292-93). 
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benefits of the inequitable conduct defense.140 Therefore, it is 
advisable for patent applicants and practitioners to keep their IDS 
practices after Therasense essentially the same, except perhaps in the 
instances where hundreds of redundant or immaterial references were 
being submitted out of an overabundance of caution. 
3. Economic Incentives to Continue with Pre-Therasense 
IDS Practices 
Patent applicants sometimes make large disclosures of 
information during prosecution. Such profligate applicants form a 
small fraction of the patent community and are generally limited to 
specific technology areas.141 Therasense may persuade some of these 
overzealous submitters to relax their IDS practices and submit fewer 
immaterial or marginally relevant references. However, for the 
average applicant citing a modest number of references, typically 
from a pre-filing search, foreign search reports, or inventors’ personal 
knowledge, Therasense may not significantly change their customary 
IDS practices. This is primarily because the practice of over-
disclosing is often less expensive to an applicant than determining the 
materiality of all known references. By erring on the side of 
submission, patent applicants and practitioners can not only enhance 
their protection from inequitable conduct allegations, but also avoid 
the cost associated with conducting materiality analysis of each and 
every piece of reference brought to the attention of the applicant 
and/or the practitioner. Such a practice essentially shifts the burden 
and cost of materiality analysis to the Patent Office. Determination of 
whether a piece of information is material is a complicated process.142 
It is less risky to submit all known references remotely related to the 
invention, regardless of whether the applicant or practitioner 
subjectively believes it to be a “material” or “cumulative” reference, 
so as to avoid a later charge of inequitable conduct arising from a 
 
 140. Johnson, supra note 20, at 204. 
 141. See generally Crouch & Rantanen, supra note 13 (noting that applicants submit over 
200 references in only 2% of cases, and 15% of patented cases include absolutely no applicant 
cited references). 
 142. Cotropia, supra note 3, at 767. 
Determinations of whether a piece of information is material are difficult. 
Materiality is a multi-step inquiry, involving the determination of each patent 
claim’s meaning, analysis of the content of the information in question, and a 
judgment as to whether the information is relevant to issues of novelty, 
nonobviousness, or the disclosure requirements. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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different subjective understanding of that reference.143 
There continues to be a strong incentive for applicants to be 
over-inclusive in their IDS submissions out of a fear that undisclosed 
prior art might be discovered during discovery and successfully 
argued to be “but-for” material during litigation. Even if unsuccessful, 
the patentee can have its credibility damaged with the fact-finder for 
failing to disclose the reference. 
Last but not the least, many applicants and practitioners already 
have established procedures and sophisticated databases to track 
references cited in counterpart foreign applications and/or in related 
families of applications. They are less likely to dismantle such 
established procedures for cross-citing references, especially given 
that complete lack of diligence can potentially ensnare the applicant 
in the egregious misconduct exception to the materiality standard.144 
Considering all of the above discussed incentives to continue to 
bring known information to the attention of the Patent Office, it seems 
highly unlikely that the information submission activities of patent 
applicants and practitioners will change significantly from their pre-
Therasense practice. 
B. Supplemental Examination Will Not Jeopardize the Duty of 
Disclosure 
The supplemental examination provision in the AIA is intended 
to curtail allegations and findings of inequitable conduct. 145 The 
provision provides a patentee with a powerful tool for strengthening 
its patent against inequitable conduct charges before a patent 
infringement action is initiated.146 
It has been argued that the supplemental examination provision 
will have a deleterious effect on patent quality because it effectively 
creates a “patent amnesty program” encouraging patent applicants to 
“obtain patents despite conduct that would be abhorrent under 
traditional understandings of a patent applicant’s obligation to be 
equitable in dealing with the public and with competitors.”147 
Supplemental examination is framed as a means to encourage 
applicants to violate their duty of candor by intentionally keeping the 
 
 143. Johnson, supra note 20, at 208-09. 
 144. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 145. See Dolak, supra note 19, at 148. 
 146. See generally Jimenez & McNeill, supra note 97. 
 147. Jason Rantanen et al., supra note 19, at 244. 
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Patent Office in the dark about prior art that would be detrimental to 
the prosecution of their application, allowing parties to monetize a 
patent that is known or suspected to be unpatentable, and thereafter 
immunizing the parties from the misconduct using supplemental 
examination if a licensee or competitor threatens litigation.148 
Nothing in the above depicted scenario is absolutely new or 
unique to the supplemental examination provision. For instance, it is 
possible to cure an intentional non-disclosure via a reissue 
application, although a reissue proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 251 is 
technically available only to correct unintentional errors which make 
the patent invalid or inoperative. This is possible because recent 
Federal Circuit case law has held that failure to include a dependent 
claim is an error that is correctible by reissue.149 Since there is no 
requirement to mention every single error, adding a dependent claim 
and initiating a reissue could possibly provide an avenue for 
correcting a non-disclosure problem, even though a patentee would 
not be shielded from allegations of inequitable conduct stemming 
from the conduct related to the error, as is the case with supplemental 
examination. 
Even if corrective measures are not available, a patent applicant 
or a practitioner may still make a strategic decision to suppress or 
misrepresent relevant information to try to maximize claim scope. 
Since the patentee controls whether and when litigation begins 
(absent enforcement efforts that can result in a declaratory judgment 
action against the patentee), the unmerited claim scope has the 
potential to deter market competition and innovation.150 Supplemental 
examination is not likely to encourage or escalate such knowing 
violations of the duty of disclosure at least because of the following 
reasons. 
1. Risk of Ex Parte Reexamination 
It is highly doubtful that patent applicants or practitioners will 
purposefully misrepresent or withhold relevant information that was 
reasonably available during prosecution, and present the same 
information to the Patent Office after issuance if a lawsuit appears on 
 
 148. Id. at 231, 244. 
 149. See In re Tanaka, 640 F.3d 1246, 1250-52 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that the addition 
of dependent claims can be the sole basis for seeking a reissue application under 35. U.S.C. 
§251 because it amounts to claiming less than the applicant has a right to claim and constitutes 
an error that can be corrected by reissue). 
 150. Dolak, supra note 19, at 168. 
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the horizon. Any competitive advantage gained from such a 
calculated scheme to deceive the Patent Office will be short-lived, 
because the Patent Office will automatically declare an ex parte 
reexamination of the patent if a prior art reference presented in the 
request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new 
question (SNQ) of patentability.151 Moreover, the chances of ex parte 
reexamination being prompted by the supplemental examination 
request are substantially high because patent applicants are not likely 
to initiate a costly and time-consuming supplemental examination 
process unless they have reason to be concerned that the undisclosed 
information will be found “but-for” material during litigation.152 
A supplemental examination request introducing a “but-for” 
material reference is very likely to raise a substantial new question of 
patentability, consequently prompting an ex parte reexamination. 
During reexamination, the affected claims will either have to be 
canceled or amended to distinguish over the reference,153 resulting in 
prosecution history estoppels and affecting claim scope under the 
Doctrine of Equivalents. 
Lastly, an ex parte reexamination proceeding takes a long time, 
currently approximately 26.3 months from the filing of the request to 
the grant of the ex parte certificate.154 To gain the shielding effect of 
supplemental examination, the patentee will potentially have to delay 
the start of litigation until reexamination is concluded.155 
In view of the high likelihood of ex parte reexamination being 
prompted by a supplemental examination request, a patentee has very 
little to gain from deliberately withholding potentially material 
information during prosecution and requesting supplemental 
examination at a later date. Contrary to the concerns raised by many 
critics, the supplemental examination provision was introduced in the 
AIA to provide patent owners with recourse to cure previously 
 
 151. 35 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2011). 
 152. See, e.g., Warren D. Woessner, Supplemental Examination Decision Tree—Lots of 
Dead Branches?, PATENTS4LIFE (Jan. 31, 2012), 
http://www.patents4life.com/2012/01/supplemental-examination-decision-tree-lots-of-dead-
branches/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2012) (discussing that savvy patent applicants and practitioners 
realize that after Therasense, a party alleging inequitable conduct must make distinct showings 
of intent to deceive and but-for materiality, and therefore, they are less likely to initiate 
supplemental examination if the undisclosed information is not likely to be found but-for 
material). 
 153. Thurlow & Elbert, supra note 94, at 3. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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unknown defects in their patents and thwart untoward allegations of 
inequitable conduct. 
With or without supplemental examination, there will always be 
some miscreant practitioners and applicants, who may knowingly 
suppress or misrepresent relevant information and deceive the Patent 
Office into issuing claims that should not have issued at all or issued 
with narrower scope. Supplemental examination cannot be rightfully 
blamed as encouraging such deceitful behavior, particular since any 
leverage gained from the misconduct would be eviscerated during the 
ex parte reexamination process. 
2. The Fraud Provision in Supplemental Examination 
The supplemental examination provision recognizes the 
importance of the duty of candor to the Patent Office by making 
supplemental examination unavailable where actual fraud has been 
committed during the initial examination of the patent.156 The AIA 
provides that if the Director of the Patent Office becomes aware 
during the supplemental examination or reexamination “that a 
material fraud on the Office may have been committed in connection 
with the patent that is the subject of the supplemental 
examination . . . , the Director shall also refer the matter to the 
Attorney General for such further action as the Attorney General may 
deem appropriate.”157 While this provision is untested, the possibility 
of criminal sanctions could further deter practitioners and patent 
applicants from committing fraud on the Patent Office during the 
initial examination of the patent. 
3. Cost Associated with Supplemental Examination 
The supplemental examination process is expected to be costly. 
On August 14, 2012, the Patent Office published the final Rules and 
Regulations for implementing the supplemental examination 
provision of the AIA.158 According to the Rules, the Patent Office will 
charge $5,140 for conducting supplemental examination of up to 12 
items of information believed to be relevant to the patent.159 If the 
request for supplemental examination raises a substantial new 
 
 156. See generally Jimenez & McNeill, supra note 97. 
 157. 35 U.S.C. § 257(e) (2011). 
 158. Changes to Implement the Supplemental Examination Provisions of the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act and to Revise Reexamination Fees, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,828 (Aug. 14, 2012) 
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 159. Id. at 48,831. 
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question of patentability, the Patent Office will initiate an ex parte 
reexamination. The patentee must submit an additional $16,120 for 
conducting ex parte reexamination when submitting the request for 
supplemental examination, which would be refunded if the request 
does not raise a substantial new question of patentability.160 Thus, the 
total up-front cost of filing a supplemental examination request 
would, at a minimum, be $21,260. If the patentee needs to have more 
than 12 items of information considered, the Rules require the 
patentee to submit a separate request and an additional $21,260 in 
fees. In addition, the Patent Office proposes to charge $170 for each 
non-patent document having from 21 to 50 sheets and $280 for each 
additional 50-sheet increment or a fraction thereof.161 All in all, 
supplemental examination is expected to be very expensive. The cost 
associated with this process will certainly deter misuse or overuse of 
this provision, particularly abuse of the provision to cure knowing and 
deliberate omissions during the initial examination. 
Accordingly, patent applicants and practitioners have many 
reasons, viz. the risk of reexamination, the fraud provision, and the 
cost associated with requesting supplemental examination, to err on 
the side of full disclosure to the Patent Office during initial 
examination. If relevant information is inadvertently withheld from 
the Office, supplemental examination will rightly insulate such 
inadvertent omission from an attack of inequitable conduct. 
It seems highly unlikely that changes in the inequitable conduct 
landscape, as a result of Therasense and supplemental examination, 
will corrupt the patent system and suppress flow of relevant 
information to the Patent Office. On the contrary, overflow of 
information to the Patent Office is likely to continue to an appreciable 
extent, because the costs and risks associated with under-disclosure 
are enormous, while there are minimal disincentives for over-
disclosure. The problem of over-disclosure has to be addressed by the 
Patent Office in other ways. 
C. Suggestions to the Patent Office for Deterring Over-
Disclosure 
The majority in Therasense reasoned that if the materiality 
standard for finding inequitable conduct is raised, patent applicants 
and practitioners would no longer be motivated to inundate the Patent 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
BHATTACHARYYA & MCGURK 5/20/2013  12:16 PM 
2013] IDS PRACTICE AFTER THERASENSE 639 
Office with marginally relevant information out of an abundance of 
caution.162 The Patent Office echoed similar views when it proposed 
to raise the materiality standard for the duty to disclose under Rule 
56.163 
There is a very slim possibility that patent applicants and 
practitioners will change their information submission practice in 
view of the Patent Office’s proposed “but-for-plus” standard of 
materiality. This is primarily because at present there are no 
deterrents to over-citing in the proposed amendments to Rule 56. 
Many patent applicants and practitioners are likely to conclude that it 
is easier, more cost-effective, and less risky to just disclose 
everything, especially from related applications, than sorting through 
all the references and making a judgment on materiality. To add to 
this problem of over-citing, the Federal Circuit raised the standard for 
finding deceptive intent in Therasense, which is likely to lower the 
chances of finding inequitable conduct on the ground that the relevant 
reference was buried amongst far less relevant references. It is 
uncertain whether deceptive intent can be the single most reasonable 
inference that can be drawn from evidence that a material reference 
was cloaked or buried by an enormous amount of marginal or 
cumulative references.164 Therefore, currently there are no 
disincentives for over-compliance with the duty of disclosure. As 
such, the problem of over-disclosure is likely to persist unless the 
Patent Office adds more teeth to their information disclosure 
requirements. 
One effort to do this was made by the Patent Office in July 2006 
when it published a set of proposed rules regarding the IDS 
practice.165 The proposed changes to the IDS requirements were 
 
 162. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 163. See Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose 
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,631 (July 21, 2011) (to be codified 
at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 164. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 658 F.3d 1347, 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). Under the Therasense standard, specific intent to deceive must be the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence. Therasense, Inc., 649 F.3d at 1290. In 
Cordis, the applicant submitted a material reference in an IDS with 60 other references and 
without emphasis. Cordis, 658 F.3d at 1353. The district court found, and the Federal Circuit 
affirmed, that defendants had failed to prove deceptive intent by clear and convincing evidence. 
Id. at 1361. The evidence of record, including the instance of burying the material reference, 
failed to unequivocally demonstrate specific intent to deceive. Id. Applicant’s patents were 
found to be not unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Id. 
 165. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements and Other Related 
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challenged in court; they were ultimately withdrawn by the Obama 
administration.166 The 2006 Proposed Rules suggested that only IDSs 
with a limited number of cites (20 or less) can be submitted before 
first Office Action without any “additional disclosure” requirement. 
Large cites (more than 25 pages) or foreign language documents, and 
IDSs submitted after first Office action must meet increasing 
“additional disclosure” requirements.167 The primary objective of the 
proposed 2006 Patent Office Rules was to reduce the number of 
references cited in an IDS such that only the most pertinent references 
were being brought to the attention of the Patent Office. 
Under the Patent Office’s current IDS requirements, there are no 
numerical limits on the number of references that can be filed in an 
IDS, no page restrictions on filing of large documents, and no extra 
fees levied for filing large IDSs. In other words, the current rules 
provide no deterrent to over-citing. Therefore, applicants and 
practitioners tend to over-comply with their duty of disclosure, 
because the cost of over-compliance is minimal compared to the cost 
of under-compliance.168 
In light of the heightened standard of materiality for inequitable 
conduct and the duty of disclosure, the Patent Office should consider 
revisiting the 2006 Rules and implementing new IDS requirements 
that would shift the burden of determining materiality to the 
applicants. By making IDS submission more costly, applicants will be 
encouraged to review the prior art and submit only those references 
that are relevant to examination and patentability. The Patent Office 
can, for example, require applicants to pay fees for documents 
comprising an excessive number of pages or references. As was 
previously proposed in the 2006 Rules, the Patent Office can also 
require applicants to submit an explanation of the cited references if 
an IDS contains more than twenty references. Another alternative 
would be to require applicants to emphasize the most relevant 
reference(s) on the IDS if they are submitting more than twenty 
references. Such actions by the Patent Office will impose a 
responsibility on the applicant or practitioner to sort through the prior 
art, assess the materiality of the references, and submit only the 
 
Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38,808, 38,808-823 (proposed July 10, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. 
pt. 1). 
 166. Cotropia et al., supra note 127, at 24. 
 167. Changes to Information Disclosure Statement Requirements, 71 Fed. Reg. at 38,808. 
 168. See Cotropia, supra note 3, at 767-68. 
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relevant references in order to keep the number of cited references 
under twenty. 
In short, the Patent Office should consider further actions to 
deter patent applicants and practitioners from flooding the Patent 
Office with marginal or barely relevant references; otherwise the 
problem of over-disclosure will not be solved. 
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Proposed Rules) 
published on July 21, 2011, the Patent Office announced that it is 
“considering further actions that may provide an incentive for 
applicants to assist the Office by explaining/clarifying the relationship 
of prior art to the claimed invention.”169 The 2011 Proposed Rules 
further states that the Patent Office “believes it is worthwhile to 
explore ways to encourage applicants to submit information, beyond 
that required under the Therasense materiality standard, that would be 
helpful and useful in advancing examination.”170 It is yet to be seen 
what actions the Patent Office is considering to incentivize applicants 
to be forthcoming with information, while deterring applicants from 
over-citing. The patent community can at least have some assurance 
that the Patent Office is cognizant of the deficiencies in their current 
IDS requirements and is contemplating further actions to require more 
applicant participation in the examination process, limit over-
disclosure of information, and ultimately improve the quality of the 
patent examination process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Therasense heightened the standards for materiality and intent 
required for a finding of inequitable conduct, and the Patent Office 
subsequently proposed to revise the materiality standard for the duty 
of disclosure to “match”171 the materiality standard for inequitable 
conduct. Despite these changes in the materiality standards, patent 
applicants and practitioners are unlikely to change their pre-
Therasense IDS practices, because there are many additional 
incentives within the patent system for applicants and practitioners to 
be over-inclusive in information disclosure to the Patent Office. The 
supplemental examination provision of the AIA is also not likely to 
 
 169. Revision of the Materiality to Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose 
Information in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,631, 43,632 (proposed July 21, 2011) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 170. Id. at 43,633. 
 171. Id. at 43,631. 
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promote intentional breaches of the duty of disclosure and repress 
information submission to the Patent Office. Accordingly, Therasense 
and supplemental examination is not likely to result in diminution in 
the amount of information submitted to the Patent Office for 
examination. To solve the problem of over-disclosure, the Patent 
Office must consider revising its current IDS requirements to actively 
deter patent applicants and practitioners from overwhelming the 
Patent Office with immaterial or marginally material references. 
